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EQUAL PROTECTION FOR NON-SUSPECT
CLASS VICTIMS OF GOVERNMENTAL
MISCONDUCT: THEORY AND PROOF
OF DISPARATE TREATMENT AND
ARBITRARINESS CLAIMS
J. MICHAEL McGuIN-Ess'
If the power-of government is brought to bear on a harmless indi-
vidual merely because a powerful state or local official. harbors a
malignant animosity toward him, the individual ought to have a
remedy in federal court... [N]either in terms nor in interpretation
is the [equal protection] clause limited to protecting members of
identifiable groups. It has long been understood to provide a kind
of last-ditch protection against government action...2
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of
government ... they do not leave room for the play and action of
purely personal and arbitrary power . .. [Tihe very idea that one
man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or
any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere
will of another, seems intolerable in any country where freedom
prevails...3
I. INTRODUCTION
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
mandates that government shall not "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The constitu-
tional text offers virtually no guidance into the meaning of equal
1. B.A. cum laude, University of North Carolina, 1979; J.D., North Carolina
Central University, 1983; post-graduate study, National Law Center, George
Washington University, 1984 - 85. Member, North Carolina, Massachusetts, and
District of Columbia Bars. Mr. McGuinness teaches constitutional litigation and
practices from his offices in Elizabethtown, North Carolina and Washington,
D.C. The author dedicates this article to the staff and members of the Southern
States Police Benevolent Association, Inc., who are constantly confronted with
the evils of abusive governmental misconduct and disparate treatment as
summarized in this article.
2. Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179-80 (7th Cir. 1995). See Murray,
Mayor Sued Under Constitution For Being "Out to Get" Citizen, LAwYERs
WEEKLY USA, May 22, 1995 at 1.
3. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886).
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protection.4 The debate over the meaning of equal protection has
raged for generations. The most recent cases confirm the diver-
gent approaches to equal protection jurisprudence.
Almost sixty years ago, Justice Holmes characterized equal
protection as "the last resort of constitutional arguments."5 How-
ever, in recent years, the equal protection guarantee has become
among the most important constitutional sources for the protec-
tion of individual rights. Whatever the abstract value or meaning
of equality, during the Warren Court era, equal protection became
a foremost means for overturning legislation and challenging gov-
ernmental misconduct. Justice Lewis Powell once described the
highest end of judicial review as protecting "the constitutional
rights and liberties of individual citizens .-.. against oppressive or
discriminatory government action.7
Perhaps the most traditional notion of equal protection is that
all similarly situated persons should be treated alike.8 This gen-
eral "nondiscrimination" principle has been applied to a broad
range of conduct including cases whereby the government has
established some form of classification scheme between individu-
als. Much of the equal protection case law deals with legislative
classification schemes9 . However, the more typical context where
4. The term equality has been widely attacked as being devoid of meaning,
"an empty vessel with no moral content of its own..." Peter Westen, The Empty
Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537, 542 (1982).
5. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
6. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTITUTioNAL LAW § 14.1,
at 568 (4th ed. 1991).
7. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell,
concurring)(emphasis added).
8. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
9. While beyond the scope of this article, legislative classification schemes
are frequently the subject of equal protection challenge. Government conduct
frequently imposes discrimination, disparate treatment and other injuries
without a technical legislative classification.
In the classic legislative context, equal protection generally mandates that
classifications not be based upon impermissible criteria or arbitrarily used to
burden a group of individuals. NowAK, supra note 6, at § 14.2. Equal protection
can be used to challenge the application of a classification scheme where the
scheme is not facially invalid. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Under "traditional" equal protection analysis when classification schemes
are in issue, a multi-tiered system of review with three levels of scrutiny has
been enunciated by the Supreme Court. See NowA, supra note 6, at § 14.2. The
Court's equal protection tests are frequently outcome determinative. An overall
assessment suggests that classifications burdening fundamental rights or
334 [Vol. 18:333
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individuals need equal protection is where the government has
acted, not through a legislative scheme, but through administra-
tive action. When government harms individuals, the injury is
often imposed through a denial of some government benefit or
privilege such as a job, license or a permit.
Traditional suspect class discrimination cases capture most of
the headlines and historical equal protection theory as taught in
traditional constitutional law courses tends to focus upon classifi-
suspect classes will not survive challenge while classifications premised upon
economic or social matters will survive challenge.
When analyzing matters involving classification schemes, the Supreme
Court continues to adhere to the deferential rationality test where the matter in
issue involves general economic or social matters. Under these tests, as long as
there is a rational basis for the governmental action, the court will not invalidate
the governmental action. However, some recent cases have challenged this
extreme deference and cases have held governmental action unconstitutional
even under the rational basis test. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (application of zoning ordinance to exclude a group
home for the retarded held unconstitutional); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14
(1985) (Vermont use tax discriminating against certain nonresidents held not to
further any legitimate governmental objective); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55
(1982) (Alaska law providing for distribution of state benefits by length of
residence held unconstitutional). These cases suggest a rationality standard
with more "bite."
The second type of equal protection review is referred to as "strict scrutiny."
This standard generally applies where there is a "suspect classification" or when
there is a "fundamental right" in issue. Classifications based upon race, national
origin and alienage are generally held to constitute suspect classes. A narrow
range of rights has been identified as fundamental rights including but not
limited to "the right to procedural fairness in regard to claims for governmental
deprivations of life, liberty or property. See QUILL, 80 F.3d at 724; NowAK, supra
note 6, at § 14.2. Where a suspect class or a fundamental right is in issue, the
government must prove a compelling governmental interest in order to uphold
the classification.
The Court has also enunciated a third test known as "intermediate
scrutiny." Under this approach, the court will not uphold a classification unless
it has a "substantial relationship" to an "important" governmental interest. This
test has ben applied by the Court in cases involving gender and illegitimacy.
One wonders whether all these different levels of scrutiny do not denigrate
the very concept of equal protection. The obvious result of these various tests are
that some get far more equal protection than others. Thus, is it really equal
protection after all? These tests for classification schemes often represent the
heart of equal protection cases arising from challenges to state or federal
legislation. However, these tests have little significance in the garden variety
equal protection challenge to local government administrative action which do
not involve traditional legislative classification schemes.
1996] 335
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cation schemes. 10 What about citizens not within any so called
suspect class who are victimized by egregious governmental mis-
conduct in a variety of contexts? Are they also to be afforded equal
protection of the law? What about citizens who are singled out for
pervasive harassment by their local government? Are they enti-
tled under the equal protection guarantee to be treated equally as
with other citizens? Can an ordinary citizen without any special
status or privilege in the law sue a corrupt local official for govern-
mental misconduct if others have been afforded preferred or differ-
ential treatment? Are angry white males entitled to any equal
protection?1" These are indeed troubling questions which have
generated conflicting and confusing decisions.
Americans from all walks of life need constitutional protec-
tion from increasingly arbitrary and oppressive government
power, more often at the local level.' 2 It appears that the greatest
threat to civil liberties arises not from more remote sources of gov-
ernment power in Washington or in Raleigh. Rather, individuals
are pervasively regulated and often harassed by smaller local gov-
ernments which appear more likely to act arbitrarily or discrimi-
natorily because the government authority tends to be
concentrated among fewer power brokers with few if any checks
on their authority. Sheriffs, police chiefs, town managers, build-
ing inspectors and other local officials are more subject to direct
political pressures and therefore appear more prone to eviscerate
the Constitution than typically more rational forces within the
state and federal governments.' 3
10. Equal protection cases addressing legislative classification schemes by
state and federal legislatures typically present governmental conduct couched in
reasonable and non-malicious terms. However, local governments, especially the
small towns and villages throughout America, are often run by politicians who
could care less about any semblance of equal protection. It is this context that
necessitates rigorous equal protection of the law.
11. Many believe that white anglo saxon protestants are without any
constitutional protection. In one recent case, Carter v. Narron, No. 92 CVS 2434
(Johnston County Superior Court 1993) (on file with author), the Defendants
argued their equal protection defense on just such simplistic terms: "Plaintiff is a
young, white, protestant, American male. He is not a member of a protected
class." Defendants' Summary Judgment Brief at 6, Carter (No. 92 CVS 2434).
12. See SAM J. ERVrN, JR., PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION 165, 213 - 14
(1984).
13. An example of abusive government conduct of local politicians appears in
Brewington v. Bedsole and Cumberland County, No. 91-120-CIV-3-H (E.D.N.C.
June 4, 1993) (case settled for $300,000.00 following partial summary judgment
for plaintiff). Brewington involved the termination of a deputy sheriff who had
[Vol. 18:333336
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A broad range of cases including government contracts, land
use disputes, building permit squabbles, business regulation, edu-
cation, licensing and permit schemes, law enforcement matters,
occupational licensing and regulation, public employment and
other disputes necessitate application of equal protection princi-
ples. These areas of traditional local government regulation is
where meaningful equal protection is sorely needed.
This article examines the parameters of equal protection for
non-suspect class victims of governmental misconduct and dispa-
rate treatment. There are several equal protection theories avail-
able for individuals not within a so called suspect class. These
cases fall into the following categories: disparate treatment, arbi-
trariness, selective enforcement and gross abuse of government
power. Although some of these areas remain "a murky corner of
equal protection law,"14 courts in recent years have extended pro-
tection to victims under a variety of equal protection theories.
Many of these non-suspect class cases do not enunciate clear rules
and further refinement of the basic rules is sorely needed.
This article provides an overview of cases exploring non-tradi-
tional equal protection principles. In particular, it outlines
Esmail v. Macrane,5 a decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. Esmail better explains how equal protection is not lim-
ited to suspect classes, but applies to all individuals regardless of
race, gender or other classification. The article also explores other
equal protection theories such as selective enforcement, disparate
treatment and gross abuse of power cases. Finally, this article
develops a practical proof analysis to illustrate what can be
offered to demonstrate improper intent for purposes of establish-
ing an equal protection violation.
spoken critically of the Fayetteville, North Carolina, Police Department, an
agency that has been plagued with endless troubles. After Brewington spoke at
a press conference and after a city council meeting, a network of local politicos
immediately went to work to extinguish Brewington's job. Leading the frenzy
was a Fayetteville City councilman, Tommy Bolton, stating, that he would "see to
it that the little [expletive] Randy Brewington would have his [expletive] fired."
The County Commissioner asked Bolton about Brewington's freedom of speech
and Bolton responded: "[expletive] ... it doesn't mean anything." This is what
the author means by a gross abuse of government power.
14. LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 608 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 959 (1981).
15. 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995).
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II. Esmail: Non-Traditional Equal Protection Clarified
In Esmail, the Seventh Circuit, speaking through Chief Judge
Richard Posner, clarified many of the subtleties of equal protec-
tion jurisprudence in equal protection arbitrariness or disparate
treatment cases. Esmail observed that "[t]he charge here is that a
powerful public official picked on a person out of sheer vindictive-
ness; and we must consider what standing such a charge has in
the law of equal protection."1 6 The court further observed that
Esmail was not complaining merely that equally or more guilty
licensees were treated more leniently. Rather, he charged that
there was "an orchestrated campaign of official harassment
directed against him out of sheer malice." 17 Esmail essentially
held that mistreating a single person because of not liking them
violates the Constitution.'" One commentator suggested that
Esmail is "apparently the first court in the Country to hold this
way."19 However, a careful examination of prior cases demon-
strates that the Esmail rule is not completely novel.2 °
A. The Facts
Esmail, a liquor dealer in Naperville, Illinois, was subjected
to a protracted course of misconduct by his local government.
Esmail owned a liquor store in Naperville since 1981. His liquor
license was issued by the City and was renewable annually.
Esmail's liquor license was renewed until 1992, when he applied
for renewal of his license and for a second license at another loca-
tion. The city prosecutor moved that both applications be denied
on three grounds: that he had given beer to a minor, one of his
managers had failed to register as the manager of the liquor store
as required by municipal code and Esmail had omitted on his
application that his license had once been revoked.2 1 Esmail had
in fact been a leader in efforts to prevent the sale of liquor to
16. Id. at 178.
17. Id. at 179.
18. See Murray, Mayor Sued Under Constitution For Being "Out to Get"
Citizen, LAwYERs WEEKLY USA, May 22, 1995 at 1.
19. See Murray, supra; see Zahra v. Town of Southfield, 48 F.3d 674 (2nd Cir.
1995).
20. For example, as Esmail observed, the Supreme Court in City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985), that some objectives of
government action simply are illegitimate. A personal vendetta, malice or bad
faith intent to injure are not legitimate governmental objectives.
21. Id. at 177.
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minors. Esmail had used a 19 year old to conduct a sting opera-
tion against his own store in order to discover whether a store
operator was actually selling alcohol to a minor. Esmail had not
bought the minor alcohol as accused.22
The unregistered store manager had been on duty for an hour
and a half. As for the failure to disclose a revocation, Esmail's
license had been revoked in 1985 because he had bought a glass of
beer for an underage female. However, the offense had not been
committed in Naperville. On appeal, the state liquor commission
reduced the revocation to a 30 day suspension. Esmail had dis-
closed the suspension on every application for renewal that he
filed after 1985.23
Naperville's mayor, who is also Naperville's liquor control
commissioner, found Esmail guilty on all charges but having pro-
vided alcohol to a minor. The mayor ordered Esmail's license
revoked and his application for a second one denied. Esmail ini-
tially turned to the state courts, which ordered renewal of his
license and that his second application be granted.24 The state
courts found that Esmail's only violation was the employment of
the unregistered manager for an hour and a half, and that viola-
tion was de minimis. What motivated this charade by the mayor?
It was because of a "deep-seated animosity" by the mayor and
other city officials.25 This animosity was in part due to the fact
that Esmail had been successful in having the 1985 revocation
changed to a suspension. The "mayor's campaign of vengeance"
against Esmail consisted of denial of liquor licenses, causing the
Naperville police to harass Esmail and his employees with intru-
sive surveillance, causing the police to stop Esmail's car, and caus-
ing false criminal charges to be lodged against Esmail.26
Esmail's equal protection claim was further premised upon
the mayor's conduct in having denied Esmail's two license applica-
tions on the basis of trivial or trumped-up criminal charges while
maintaining a policy and practice of routinely granting new liquor
licenses to persons who had engaged in similar conduct. Esmail
pled a list of examples, of arguably more serious infractions than
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. Despite the relief in state court, Esmail suffered over $75,000.00 in
legal fees to get his license applications finally granted.
25. Unfortunately, this type of abusive attitude permeates much of
government throughout America. That is why the Esmail rule is so significant.
26. Esmail, 53 F.3d at 178.
1996] 339
7
McGuinness: Equal Protection for Non-Suspect Class Victims of Governmental Mi
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Esmail was charged with, yet others were punished more lightly
or not at all. The District court dismissed Esmail's complaint for
failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed and pro-
vided an excellent overview of the prevailing equal protection
trends in nontraditional discrimination cases.
B. The Reasoning of Esmail
Judge Posner's analysis for the court began by outlining the
two most common kinds of equal protection cases. "One involves
singling out members of a vulnerable group, racial or otherwise,
for unequal treatment."28 Second, challenges to laws or policies
alleged to make irrational distinctions. Esmail did not fit either of
these two common forms of equal protection problems. 29 Nor was
Esmail pled as a case of selective prosecution or First Amendment
deprivation.
Esmail complained that there was an "orchestrated campaign
of official harassment directed against him out of sheer malice."3 °
The question presented was whether the equal protection guaran-
tee is contravened where a powerful public official picked on a per-
son out of sheer vindictiveness. One would surmise that this is a
clear and settled proposition. However, some cases reject this rea-
soning and other cases not only fail to enunciate bright lines but
lack any clear identification of the elements of such a claim.
Esmail's conclusion is grounded in the Constitution's rich history
of preventing government from arbitrarily attacking citizens.
Esmail's prohibition of personal harassment is grounded in case
law dating back over a hundred years. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1
the Supreme Court observed that equal protection precluded the
use of "purely personal and arbitrary power."
C. Smith v. Eastern New Mexico Follows Esmail
Esmail has already been expressly followed in the Tenth Cir-
cuit. In Smith v. Eastern New Mexico,8 2 the court reversed sum-
mary judgment for a public employer after the public employee
plaintiffs left their positions following a series of alleged wrongful
disciplinary actions. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants'
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
32. No. 94-2213, 1995 WL 749712 (10th Cir. 1995).
340 [Vol. 18:333
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conduct was improper, malicious and motivated by personal ani-
mosity. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
because of the plaintiffs' lack of "membership in a constitutionally
protected group. 33 Relying heavily upon Esmail, the Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed.
The Tenth Circuit observed that the defendants' conduct con-
stituted "fraud, malice and oppression and were motivated by a
desire to promote their own economic interests."34 The court con-
cluded that the Equal Protection Clause protects individuals
where there is "an element of intentional or purposeful discrimi-
nation" against "an individual victim. '35 As in Esmail, no suspect
class or fundamental right was present.
III. THE FOUNDATION OF THE ESMAIL DECISION
The Seventh Circuit recognized the Esmail decision was
"unusual" but not "unprecedented."36 However, Judge Posner
grounded the court's decision in part upon cases dealing with
selective enforcement of neutral laws and policies, i.e. "challenges
to laws or polices alleged to make irrational distinctions." 7
A. Equal Protection Premised Upon Selective Enforcement or
Prosecution
Before Esmail, equal protection theories in public employ-
ment and other governmental contexts were predicated upon a
selective enforcement rationale where there is vindictiveness
underlying the government conduct. Since 1944, the Supreme
Court has recognized that selective enforcement is a basis of an
equal protection claim where there is no protected class.38 An
arbitrary basis for the decision is generally enough to ground a
33. Id. at *1.
34. Id. at *6.
35. Id. at *7.
36. Esmail, 53 F.3d at 178.
37. Id.
38. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1944); Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S.
448 (1962) (discrimination prohibited on grounds of race, religion or other
arbitrary classification); McFarland v. American Sugar, 241 U.S. 79, 86-87
(1916), where Justice Holmes found that a statute that "bristled "with severities
that touch the plaintiff alone" was arbitrary and a violation of equal protection.
See also Acevedo v. Surles, 778 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). For a case
cataloging selective enforcement cases, see E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d
1107, 1112-13 (11th Cir. 1987).
1996] 341
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selective enforcement claim upon as long as the requisite vindic-
tiveness is present.
Esmail heavily relied upon Ciechon v. City of Chicago,39 as
precedent for its central proposition. Ciechon reasoned that
"[e]qual protection demands at a minimum that... [government]
must apply its laws in a rational and nonarbitrary4° way. "41 The
case involved a personnel dispute whereby the plaintiff, a
paramedic, was fired as a result of alleged mistreatment of a
patient on an ambulance run. However, Ciechon and her partner
paramedic, Ritt, were equally responsible for the welfare of a
patient. However, Ciechon was fired and Ritt was not punished at
all. The court's decision in Ciechon was grounded upon the fact
that the "defendants purposely and invidiously chose one of two
similarly situated employees for undeserved punishment and mis-
used otherwise legitimate disciplinary procedures...,4 No sus-
pect class or fundamental right was present.
Another leading illustrative selective enforcement case in the
personnel context appears in Ziegler v. Jackson.3 In Ziegler, the
Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment and imposed judgment
as a matter of law for the employee where a police officer was ter-
minated for a misdemeanor criminal conviction of a firearm and
provocation offense. Three other officers were retained despite
their convictions for assault and battery.44 The court reasoned
that there was no justification for the disparate treatment
between the Plaintiff and the three other officers.45 Other cases
39. 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
40. Arbitrary and capricious is defined as "willful and unreasonable action
without consideration or in disregard of facts or without determining principle."
BLAcKs LAW DicTioNARY 96 (5th ed. 1979). For additional definitions of arbitrary
and capricious see United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 n.14 (1946).
Arbitrary is defined as "without adequate determining principle... [or] fixed or
arrived at through an exercise of will or by caprice, without consideration or
adjustment with reference to principles, circumstances, or significance, . . .
decisive but unreasoned . . . ." Id. See also Bruno's, Inc. v. United States, 624
F.2d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1980) (arbitrary and capricious means either
"unwarranted in law" or "without justification in fact").
41. Ciechon, 686 F.2d at 522. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374
(1886).
42. Ciechon, 686 F.2d at 517.
43. 638 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1981).
44. Id. at 777-778.
45. Cases have held other types of employee harassment actionable under
equal protection. See Bremiller v. Cleveland, 879 F. Supp. 782, 792 (N.D. Ohio
1995) (sex harassment actionable under equal protection).
342 [Vol. 18:333
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are in accord. 46 Ziegler demonstrates how a plaintiff can be culpa-
ble of some wrongdoing yet still be subject to the equal protection
principle.47 Ziegler did not involve suspect classes yet applied
equal protection principles in favor of the employees involved.
Another landmark case explaining these principles is LeClair
v. Saunders48 where the court held that a "selective treatment"49
claim may be premised upon "intent to inhibit or punish the exer-
cise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to
injure a person."50 LeClair observed that equal protection may be
violated when "unequal administration of a state statute shows
intentional or purposeful discrimination." Recent cases using the
LeClair theory have been successful.5 '
46. See Olschock v. Village of Skokie, 541 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1976)
(differential discipline violative of equal protection); Massey v. Inland Boatman's
Union, 886 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989). Equal protection claims have been stated
by inmates where it was alleged that some were subjected to arbitrary denial of
hearing procedures while others were not. E.g., Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365
(7th 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979); Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993
(7th Cir. 1980).
47. Cf Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1984) (white
employees allowed to misuse city resources without punishment while black fired
for such violations).
48. 627 F.2d 606, 609-10 (2nd Cir. 1980).
49. "Singling out [an individual] for different treatment, prejudicial
treatment, constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws. . . This
governmental action is also a denial of Bannum's substantive due process
rights." Bannum v. City of Memphis, 666 F. Supp. 1091, 1093 (W.D. Tenn. 1987).
50. 627 F.2d at 609-10 (emphasis added). This test, with alternative
standards, is indeed broad and sweeps much government oppression within its
ambit.
51. Latrieste v. Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590-91 (2nd Cir. 1994) (selective
enforcement claim under LeClair sufficient for jury); Terminate v. Horwitz, 28
F.3d 1335, 1352 (2nd Cir. 1994) (reversing summary judgment); Quartararo v.
Catterson, 917 F. Supp. 919, 946 - 47 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)(denying motion to
dismiss); see also Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89 (2nd Cir. 1963).
In Rubinowitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906 (1st Cir. 1995), the First Circuit
reaffirmed the basic rule that "a party may establish an equal protection
violation with evidence of bad faith or malicious intent to injure." Id. at 911. The
court in Rubinowitz relied upon Esmail but questioned whether something
substantially more than a single act of malice should be required. Rubinowitz
observed that "the malice/bad faith standard should be scrupulously met." Id.
1996] 343
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B. Jetstream & the Selective Enforcement /Anti-Harassment
Doctrine
In Jetstream AERO Services, Inc. v. New Hanover County,52
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment
on Plaintiff's equal protection claim. In Jetstream, the plaintiff
was a fixed base operator that provided basic support services for
airplanes including fuel, repair, parking and storage. Plaintiff's
workplace was leased from the County. Plaintiffs operation is
subject to a variety of regulations including those in its lease with
the County, local rules particular to the airport, state building and
safety codes and Federal Aviation Administration rules. In addi-
tion to the county, Plaintiff sued other defendants who provide
similar support services for airplanes at the New Hanover County
Airport. 53
The Plaintiff alleged that the County wrongfully and inten-
tionally used its regulatory and enforcement powers in a manner
calculated to harm the Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that the County
was discriminating against it by engaging in acts of harassment
including unfair enforcement of the lease between the County and
Plaintiff. County officials participated in investigatory meetings
"in a spirit of anger and hostility against Jetstream."5 4
The Fourth Circuit observed further evidence that the New
Hanover County manager had threatened to send inspectors to
Jetstream if Jetstream appealed adverse building code deci-
sions. 55 The Fourth Circuit accepted the foregoing as evidence
that the County intended to enforce the law selectively against
Jetstream and that this was done with a malicious or bad faith
intent to harm. The trial court had recognized this as evidence of
hostility, but claimed that it was insufficient. The Fourth Circuit
reasoned LeClair did not require more, stating, "if defendant went
after plaintiff to get him, for any reason, he should be liable."56
The emphasis in Jetstream and LeClair that if there were evi-
dence that a plaintiff had been harassed for any reason suggests
that the threshold for liability, at least so as to avoid summary
judgment, is not especially difficult in this equal protection
context.
52. No. 88-1748, 1989 WL 100644 (4th Cir. August 15, 1989).
53. Id. at *2.
54. Id. at *3.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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In so far as a causation standard is concerned, Jetstream held
that:
[T]he better rule is one that recognizes that a reasonable temporal
conjunction between the evidence of animosity and the occurrence
of wrongful acts is more appropriate to equal protection. To
require a special connection between each harmful act and specific
evidence of intent, particularly in this context where evidence of
intent is difficult to achieve, would tend to emasculate the right
recognized in LeClair.5 7
The Fourth Circuit observed that "lolur inquiry on this point is
directed to whether Jetstream was treated differently."58 There
was evidence that the County manager was interested in finding a
way to shut down Jetstream from part of its functions. Jetstream
further offered a number of additional actions taken by the
County that were suggestive of arbitrary, discriminatory and
unreasonable conduct.
The trial court applied a rational basis test and held that the
action of the County must bear only a rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental interest. The Fourth Circuit reversed,
reasoning that "public authority to harass a business without
cause is not a legitimate state interest."5 9 Jetstream therefore
represents further foundation for the Esmail principle.
C. Equal Protection Remedies For Other Governmental Abuses
Before Esmail, equal protection was also held to prohibit
additional types of governmental misconduct:
Equal protection rights may be violated by gross abuse of power,
invidious discrimination, or fundamentally unfair procedures. 60
Equal protection does require at the least, however, that the state
act sensibly and in good faith.6 '
One court held an equal protection violation may be premised
upon proof that government officials "are guilty of grave unfair-
57. Id.
58. Id. at *4.
59. Id. at *5.
60. Dean Tarry Corp. v. Friedlander, 650 F. Supp. 1544, 1552 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
affd, 826 F.2d 210 (2nd Cir. 1987); Creative Environment v. Easterbrook, 680
F.2d 822, 832 n. 9 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982).
61. Brandon v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56, 56 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985), quoting Logan v. Zimmerman Brush,
455 U.S. 422, 439 (1981).
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ness in the discharge of their responsibilities."62 However, few
cases have successfully applied the equal protection principle in
such broad strokes. The gross abuse of government power cases in
the equal protection context are analogous to the "shock the con-
science" substantive due process line of cases.63 For example,
Benigni v. City of Hemet, 4 held that law enforcement harassment
of a business is actionable through substantive due process.
There, the evidence indicated that police conduct was intention-
ally directed towards Benigni's bar to force him out of business.
Bar "checks" occurred nightly, up to five or six times per night,
and customers were frequently followed from the bar. A verdict of
$305,500.00 was affirmed.
In conclusion, before Esmail, most individual plaintiffs not
members of a suspect class were limited to narrow and difficult-to-
prove claims unless they could establish some gross abuse of
power or serious lack of good faith. These cases provided the theo-
retical foundation for the Esmail proposition that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause protects all individuals, not just arguably special
groups or types of people.
IV. FUTERNICK v. SUMPTER fOWNSHzP: ONE COURT'S RETREAT
FROM EQUAL PROTECTION IN CASES OF MALICE AND
PERSONAL VENDETTAS
In Futernick vs. Sumpter Township,65 the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of an equal protection claim by an owner of
a mobile home park in an action against state and local govern-
ment officials involved in regulating the plaintiffs mobile home
parks. Futernick involved an allegation that the government reg-
ulatory agency selectively enforced the local environmental regu-
lations maliciously and in bad faith against the plaintiff. After a
disagreement with the plaintiff, the government stopped work on
a proposed sewer line extension to one of the plaintiffs' mobile
home parks. The trial court dismissed Futernick's equal protec-
tion claim pursuant to rule 12(b)(6). The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
62. Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
63. See J. Michael McGuinness, The Reemergence of Substantive Due Process
As A Constitutional Tort: Theory, Proof & Damages, 24 NEw ENGLAND L. REV.
1129, 1149-52 (1990).
64. 868 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1988).
65. 78 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir. 1996).
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The court in Futernick began its analysis by summarily trac-
ingthe doctrine of selective enforcement.66 Futernick recognized
application of the selective enforcement doctrine where a victim
can establish that he or she was intentionally singled out because
of membership in a protected group or for the exercise of a consti-
tutionally protect right. "Selective enforcement can also lead to
Section 1983 liability if the plaintiff pleads 'purposeful discrimina-
tion' intended to accomplish some forbidden aim."67
Futernick addressed the elements of "purposeful discrimina-
tion" intended to accomplish "some forbidden aim."68 The court
observed that the issue of first impression before the court was
"what aims are forbidden ones for purposes of a selective enforce-
ment action under Section 1983. " 69 Therefore, the critical issue
became what is a "forbidden aim" or "unjustifiable standard" for
purposes of an improper intent based equal protection claim.7 °
The court went on to address the more fundamental issue of
whether selective enforcement based upon malicious or bad faith
selective enforcement stated an the equal protection claim. The
essential question is whether or not malice or personal animosity
is a constitutionally permissible consideration.7 ' The court
observed that the First and Second Circuits recognize a valid
selective enforcement claim premised upon the malice and bad
faith theory.72 Futernick mentioned but did not distinguish
LeClair and its progeny. However, Futernick miraculously failed
to address or mention Esmail, or its primary antecedents or
progeny.
The Six Circuit's rationale in Futernick and its conclusion
failing to afford equal protection for victims of governmental mali-
ciousness, egregious bad faith and/or personal animosity is espe-
66. Id. at 1056.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1057. See Oyler vs. Boles. 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) ("The conscious
exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional
violation" if "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable
standard.").
70. Futernick observed that a selective enforcement claim could properly be
premised upon: (1) race, nationality, religion or gender or (2) punishment of the
exercise of a constitutional right. In addition to the traditional suspect classes
afforded relief under the equal protection clause, Futernick observed that Oyler
provided that equal protection forbids "other arbitrary classification." Id.
71. Id. at 1057.
72. Id. at 1057-58.
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cially troubling. The court observed that "we see compelling
reasons that the sundry motivations of local regulators should not
be policed by the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution, absentee intent to harm a protected group or punish
the exercise of a fundamental right."73 The court observed that
"[t]he sheer number of possible cases is discouraging. "74 While
this "floodgates" argument is frequently cited as basis to not
extend the law, Futernick's particular characterization of this con-
tention underscores the fact that government abuse throughout
America is rampant.
The court observed that "a regulator is required to make diffi-
cult, and often completely arbitrary, decisions about who will bear
the brunt of finite efforts to enforce the law."7 5 The court cited no
evidence or basis to support its contention that regulators are
required to make "completely arbitrary" decisions. In fact, the
contrary appears far more likely. Regulators typically have facts,
regulations and information to assist them in making regulatory
decisions. There is no justification for allowing the government to
act at whim or without consideration of the facts. Neither is there
any rational basis or other justification to allow the government to
carry out a personal vendetta against an individual. The question
becomes whether a regulator will reasonably decide the issue
based on the facts or whether he or she will orchestrate a cam-
paign of harassment to harm an individual out of vindictiveness or
other improper motive.
Futernick observed that "[tihe nature of the right to equal
protection also counsels against expanding a federal right to pro-
tection from non-group animosity on the part of local officials."76
However, the court cited no case or other authority to support this
sweeping proposition.
Futernick reasoned that "the presence of personal animosity
should not turn an otherwise valid enforcement action into a vio-
lation of the Constitution... The Constitution's protection begins
only when the incidence of the burden of regulation becomes con-
stitutionally suspicious." 77 Should it make any difference whether
improper animosity is inspired by group characteristics or because
of a personal dislike or otherwise? The more logical position
73. Id. at 1058.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1058.
76. Id. at 1059.
77. Id. at 1059.
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appears to be that governmental conduct should not be premised
upon either group or individual animus. Rather, government con-
duct should be based upon good faith and a rational application of
applicable regulatory criteria. It seems that irrational personal or
malicious animosity is an improper consideration in regulatory
decisions regardless of what inspires the animosity. A plethora of
cases have demonstrated that such irrational personal animosity
is sufficient to contravene substantive due process.7 8
In dicta, Futernick observed:
[w]e certainly do not sanction the abuse of state or local regulatory
power. Regulation out of personal dislike or vendetta is repugnant
to the American tradition to the rule of law."
The foregoing proposition provides ample support for the Esmail
doctrine and undercuts the argument developed by the court in
Futernick.
Futernick construed the concept of "arbitrary classification"
as a basis for selecting enforcement liability, stating, "[w]e do not
believe that choosing to enforce a law against a particular individ-
ual is a 'classification' as that term is normally understood."79
However, enforcement of the law is certainly government conduct
that is actionable through the Equal Protection Clause.
As an alternative remedy, Futernick suggested that "[tihose
affected by the unfair regulator have recourse to the state political
processes that appointed that regulator in the first place. State
courts or the state constitution may provide protection." 0 It
seems difficult to believe that the court seriously suggested that
78. See, e.g., Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1140 (3rd Cir. 1988); Marks v. City,
883 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1989); J. Michael McGuinness, The Reemergence of
Substantive Due Process As A Constitutional Tort: Theory, Proof & Damages, 24
NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 1129 (1990),
In Browning Ferris v. Wake County, 905 F. Supp. 312 (E.D.N.C. 1995), the
court recently addressed the contours of substantive due process in a dispute
over sewer service for certain property. This court granted plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment and reasoned that the governmental action violated
substantive due process "if it is arbitrary or capricious, lacks a rational basis, or
is undertaken with improper motives." Id. at 319.
"There is a species of substantive due process, apart from any specific of the
Bill of Rights... this is a substantive due process right akin to the fundamental
fairness concept of procedural due process." Wilson v. Beebe 770 F. 2d 578, 586
(6th Cir. 1985). Substantive due process "is available to protect individual rights
against irrational government action." HENRY H. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DIsMIssAL
LAw AND PRACTICE, § 6.13, at 350 (2d ed. 1987).
79. Futernick, 78 F.3d at 1058.
80. Id. at 1059. (emphasis added).
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the appointing authority for the government official would provide
relief for a victimized citizen. The court in Futernick does not
apparently recognize the inner workings of local politics and
patronage throughout America. The court was out of touch with
the reality of bureaucratic politics. The suggestion that state
courts "may" provide protection is equally telling.
Futernick represents a glaring minority position in equal pro-
tection jurisprudence fundamentally at odds with over one hun-
dred years of equal protection. Futernick's rationale subverts
equal protection to such an extent that it inherently implies, if not
suggests, that government officials should be free to maliciously
and in bad faith attack individuals out of a personal dislike or ven-
detta. A personal vendetta employed by a public official to abuse
government power to harm an individual should constitute a "for-
bidden aim" under Futernick and an "unjustifiable standard"
under Oyler.
The rationale offered in Futernick is among the most frighten-
ing retreats in basic equal protection principles. While on the one
hand, Futernick generally recognizes that "regulation out of per-
sonal dislike or vendetta is repugnant to the American tradition of
the rule of law," the court proceeded to enunciate a theory inviting
further disdain and repugnance to the American tradition of the
rule of law.
Futernick's "floodgates" argument was not supported by any
citation of authority, any statistics or otherwise. In fact, the few
reported decisions construing this particular strand of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence are extremely sparse. This is not a legal
theory which has been widely used perhaps because of its ill
defined elements and the difficulties in the capturing proof of mal-
ice. However, despite these theories, speculation of possible flood-
gates of cases hardly justifies eliminating a developing theory of
recovery to combat egregious governmental abuse at a time when
individuals throughout America are being more frequently
harassed by local politicos and regulators.
Futernick's suggestion that victims of unfair regulators can
obtain relief from "state political processes that appointed that
regulator in first place" is even more disingenuous. The Sixth Cir-
cuit's position in this regard runs afoul of the fundamental place
that federal courts have in our system of government and the tra-
dition of the rule of law. In conclusion, Futernick is an aberration
fundamentally at odds with the vast majority of other circuit court
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cases construing this particular strand of the equal protection
principle.
V. EQUAL PROTECTION PROOF ANALYSIS To SHOW
IMPROPER INTENT
A. Where Does One Look for Proof?
Given the striking similarities in substantive due process and
equal protection analysis,"' the proof factors developed in sub-
stantive due process cases are helpful in assessing certain types of
equal protection claims.82 For example, one court stated that "the
existence of bias, bad faith or other improper motive may be an
excellent indicator of arbitrary government conduct." 3
In the leading case of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropol-
itan Housing Development Corporation,4 the Supreme Court
identified several factors to be examined to determine whether
discriminatory intent or purpose is present. Those factors are:
(1) The impact of the governmental action;
(2) The historical background of the decision, particularly if it
reveals a series of actions taken for invidious purposes;
(3) The sequence of events leading up to the decision;
(4) Departures from normal procedure;
(5) Departures from normal substantive criteria;
81. See Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1328-29 (6th Cir. 1988)
(substantive due process and equal protection are "very similar concepts.., both
stem from our American ideals of fundamental fairness and both enmesh the
judiciary in substantive review of governmental action.., they will overlap in
certain situations so that a violation of one will constitute a violation of the
other."); Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1257 (5th Cir. 1988) (the court
delineated the framework of rights afforded under both substantive due process
and equal protection); Vasquez v. Cooper, 862 F.2d 250, 254-55 (10th Cir. 1988);
Benigni v. City of Hemet, 868 F.2d 307, 312 (9th Cir. 1989) ("the due process and
equal protection theories in this case are practically identical, both being
grounded on the allegation of arbitrary law enforcement activit[ies] . . ."). See
Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
956 (1988) (to show an equal protection or substantive due process violation, a
plaintiff must at least establish "grave unfairness").
82. See J. Michael McGuinness, Constitutional Employment Litigation: Trial
of the Political Discharge Case, 43 AM JUR TRiALs 1 (1991).
83. Epstein v. Township of Whitehall, 693 F. Supp. 309, 313 (E.D.Pa. 1988)
(substantive due process and equal protection claims stated where development
plan was rejected because of developer's refusal to waive contractual rights).
Accord, Dynalectron Corp. v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 64, 68 (D.D.C. 1987)
(subjective bad faith is an indicia of arbitrary action).
84. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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(6) The legislative or administrative history;
(7) Contemporaneous statements by members of the decision-
making body.8 5
Numerous cases have employed these factors or similar varia-
tions thereof 86 "Determining whether invidious discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be avail-
able."8 7 A finding of improper intent is certainly not limited to
instances where decision-makers articulate some bad purpose. "If
proof of a civil right[s] violation depends on an open statement by
an official . . ., the Fourteenth Amendment offers little solace to
those seeking its protection."8 8 In Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 9
the Fourth Circuit recognized that statements revealing improper
intent are often "camouflaged."90 As Chief Justice Rehnquist has
explained: "There will seldom be eyewitness testimony as to the
employer's mental processes."91
Invidious discriminatory or improper intent "may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts."92 The Supreme
Court has held that one need not submit "direct evidence of dis-
criminatory intent."93 Some direct evidence, however, may often
85. Id. at 266-68.
86. J. Michael McGuinness, Fundamental Issues In Housing Discrimination
Litigation: Procedure, Standing, and Standard of Proof, 14 N.C. CENT. L.J. 555,
578-80 (1984).
87. Arlington, 429 U.S. at 266.
88. Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970).
89. 682 F.2d 1055, 1066 (4th Cir. 1982). Disparaging remarks towards the
plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Johnson v.
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 581 F. Supp. 338 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
90. Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1066 (4th Cir. 1982).
91. United States Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (direct
evidence of improper intent is not required). See Kercado v. Aponte-Rogue, 829
F.2d 255, 264 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988).
92. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). See Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 362-363 (1886) (statute facially neutral but an equal protection
violation for administration of a building code "with an evil eye and unequal
hand"). See also Barnes v. Yellow Freight, 778 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
93. Postal Service, 460 U.S. at 717. See Kercado-Melendez, 829 F.2d at 264
("Proof of such an improper motive may be shown via circumstantial evidence.");
Rokovich v. Wade, 819 F.2d 1393, 1398 (7th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds,
850 F.2d 1180 (1988) (proof of actual intent to retaliate against employee for
exercise of constitutional rights not required; jury allowed to examine totality of
evidence and to "infer a retaliatory motive."); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc.,
814 F.2d 893, 899 (3rd Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987)
(exhaustive analysis of proof of intent and the burden of proof).
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be the key to ultimate success. Finally, it is not necessary to prove
that the challenged decision rested solely on an improper or dis-
criminatory purpose. 94 However, it must be established that an
improper or discriminatory purpose has been one of the motivat-
ing factors involved but it need not be the dominant or primary
purpose.9 5 While the case law has somewhat eased the technical
burden in proving intent, practical proof of improper intent is
often difficult to capture.
B. Causation Issues in Equal Protection Cases
The prevailing proof standard essentially requires a Plaintiff
to establish that an improper reason was a substantial or motivat-
ing factor in the decision to terminate.9 6 The "substantial or moti-
vating factor" issue is ordinarily a question of fact to be decided by
the jury.97 In Hall v. Marion, the Fourth Circuit explained that
the causation determination "is a factual one."98
The doctrine of inferred intent is the primary means by which
the typical plaintiff will use to survive summary judgment.99 In
the leading case of Anthony v. Sundlin, °00 the court explained:
[W]hat an actor says is not conclusive on a state-of-mind issue.
Notwithstanding a person's disclaimers, a contrary state of mind
may be inferred from what he does and from a factual mosaic
tending to show that he really meant to accomplish that which he
professes not to have intended. 10 '
In Carrington v. Hunt, et. al.,1°2 the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina issued a substantial opin-
ion treating the causation issue in a public employee free speech
case. The court's analysis demonstrates how imperative it is to
afford an employee "the benefit of all conflicting inferences consid-
94. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265; Smith, 682 F.2d at 1066.
95. Arlington, 429 U.S. at 265-66; Smith, 682 F.2d at 1066.
96. E.g., Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 733 F.2d 260, 264 (2nd Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 886 (1984); Rivera-Cotto v. Rivera, 38 F.3d 611, 614 (1st Cir.
1994).
97. Roberts v. Van Buren Public Schools, 773 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1985).
98. 31 F.3d 183, 192 (4th Cir. 1994). See Carr v. Woolworth, 883 F. Supp. 10,
16 (E.D.N.C. 1992), affirmed, 42 F.3d 1385 (4th Cir. 1994) where Judge Boyle
addressed causality as involving "questions of fact and credibility" thus denying
summary judgment.
99. See, e.g., Rokovich v. Wade, 819 F.2d 1393, 1398 (7th Cir. 1987).
100. 952 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1992).
101. Id. at 606.
102. No. 94-CV-324-BR2 (E.D.N.C. August 3, 1995)(on file with author).
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ered" in deciding causation on summary judgment.10 3 The court
then sifted through the contentions and concluded that "the reso-
lution of a question of intent often depends upon the credibility of
the witness, which can best be determined by the trier of fact after
observing the demeanor of the witnesses during direct and cross
examination."0 4 Summary judgment was therefore denied. The
court observed that the plaintiff raised sufficient evidence to sup-
port a credible argument that the Defendant's purported justifica-
tion for dismissing plaintiff may be a pretextual argument
conceived after the initiation of the lawsuit. The recent Fifth Cir-
cuit case Fowler v. Smith'0 5 demonstrates the essence of the cau-
sation principle:
[D]irect evidence in proving illegitimate intent is not required to
avoid summary judgment in unconstitutional retaliation claims;
circumstantial evidence will' suffice.... We recognize that direct
evidence of improper motive is usually difficult, if not impossible,
to obtain and requiring direct evidence would effectively insulate
from suit public officials who deny an improper motive. 10 6
C. Factors Demonstrating Improper Motive & Causation
The following categories have been relied upon as a basis for a
sufficient inference of a retaliatory or improper motive to establish
a violation of equal protection. 10 7 Many of these factors are more
prevalent in public employment litigation, but most are equally
applicable in other constitutional litigation.
(1) Governmental decisionmaker's attitude regarding the con-
duct of the individual or employee. A hostile attitude sug-
gests an improper motive.'0 8
103. Id. at 25.
104. Id. at 29.
105. 68 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1995).
106. Id. at 127.
107. See, e.g., Jim Causley v. N.L.R.B., 620 F.2d 122, 125 (6th Cir. 1980);
Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
979 (1981); Lewis Grocer Co. v. Holloway, 874 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1989). See also
Russell L. Wald, Retaliatory Termination of Private Employment, 7 POF2d 1
(1975); 1 KENT SPRIGGS, REPRESENTING PLAInrFFS iN TITLE VII AcTiONS §5.15
(1994).
108. See Jetstream AERO Services, Inc. v. New Hanover County, No. 88-1748,
1989 WL 100644 (4th Cir. August 15, 1989).
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(2) Disparate treatment, particularly unequal discipline among
employees or individuals.'
0 9
(3) Reduced employee evaluations after engaging in protected
conduct.
(4) Manner, tone and language of how the individual is informed
of the deprivation.
(5) Inadequate investigation of allegations surrounding the
adverse action. Failing to review and consider all facts pur-
portedly in the individual's favor suggests arbitrariness.
1 10
(6) Deviations from routine procedures.
(7) Lack of reasonable warnings or notice of alleged violation or
noncompliance.
(8) Temporal proximity. Timing of the adverse action following
engagement in protected activity."'
(9) The magnitude of the alleged offense. Comparisons of pun-
ishment showing that the employee has been more harshly
punished than others suggests an improper motive.
(10) History of employee's work performance. A drastic alleged
decline in performance is suspect.
(11) Investigation or scrutiny of employee's conduct following pro-
tected conduct.
(12) The employer's creation of the problem that is supposedly the
basis for the employer's criticism of the employee.
(13) Subjectivity in termination or rejection criteria.1 12
(14) Pretext (proof that the articulated reason is not the true
reason).
(15) Employee's lack of history of the alleged basis of termination.
(16) Changed grounds for the adverse action. 113
109. Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1984). See generally
Krieger v. Gold, 863 F.2d 1091 (2nd Cir. 1988); Ramsuer v. Chase, 865 F.2d 460
(2nd Cir. 1989).
110. See Martinez v. El Paso, 710 F.2d 1102, 1104 (5th Cir. 1983).
111. Warren v. Halstead Indus., 802 F.2d 746, 758 (4th Cir. 1986), affd en
banc, 835 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).
112. See Rowe v. General Motors Corp. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972); Halstead,
802 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1987); Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976);
SPRIGGS, supra note 82, at § 21.3.
113. Changed asserted grounds for termination are among the most telling
factors ascertaining pretext. SPRIGGS, supra note 107, at § 19.24. For example,
in Schmitz v. St. Regis, 811 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1988), one court was confronted
with a similar situation where one reason was initially given to the company
officer, another reason was given to an administrative agency and yet a much
more sophisticated reason was offered at trial. Cf Sweat v. Miller, 708 F.2d 655
1996] 355
23
McGuinness: Equal Protection for Non-Suspect Class Victims of Governmental Mi
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
(17) The government's failure to adhere to its own procedural or
substantive regulations.1 1 4
(18) Undue delay in processing applications.
(19) Changes in the course of dealings among the parties.
(20) Changes in qualifications or rules after commencement of
selection process.
(21) A secret paper trail, without notice to the employee. 1 5
(22) Delayed articulation of alleged justification.11 6
Under the Esmail test, the threshold for surviving summary
judgment on proof issues is relaxed. Some of the foregoing criteria
should suffice to infer an improper motive to reach the jury.
VI. CONCLUSION
Esmail breathes new life into the Equal Protection Clause for
the vast array of Americans who are not afforded some special sta-
tus or privilege in the law through a so called suspect class.
Esmail's antecedents afforded a minimal foundation of protection
for individuals which Esmail has clarified and expanded.
Esmail reaffirms what should be obvious: the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is not limited to suspect classes or fundamental rights.
The Equal Protection Clause is a foremost means for all individu-
als, regardless of status, in the limited arsenal of weapons to com-
bat the increasingly abusive power of government. Equal
protection lives to fulfill the thrust of Marbury v. Madison 1 7 -
(11th Cir. 1983) (reversing summary judgment due to the indicia of pretext
where differing accounts of the reasons for the termination were in record).
114. The representations made by the government in ordinances, personnel
policies and personnel handbooks must be scrupulously adhered to. E.g.,
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 546 (1959) (Frankfurter concurring); Service v.
Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1942). Where
government employment is premised upon a defined procedure, the procedure
should also be scrupulously observed. Vitarelli held that government
employment regulations must be adhered to by the government. In that case,
the court reversed and found plaintiffs discharge invalid. Accord, Beacom v.
EEOC, 500 F. Supp. 428 (D. Ariz. 1980) (public employee must be accorded
benefit of agency's regulations). A regulation or rule promulgated by the
government may create a property interest without regard to the traditional
requirements of contract formation. See Hohmeier v. Leyden, 954 F.2d 461, 464
(7th Cir. 1992).
115. See Harris v. Richards, 511 F. Supp. 1193 (W.D.Tenn. 1981).
116. Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1991) (four month delay
was evidence of pretext).
117. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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that "the very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right
of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever
he receives an injury."11 Governmental misuse of "purely per-
sonal and arbitrary power"119 has been condemned from Yick Wo
to Esmail. Persons who are not members of traditional protected
classes victimized by a corrupt local politician now have an equal
protection prayer for relief under Judge Posner's rationale in
Esmail. As it should be.
118. Id. at 163. Accord, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1885), where
the United States Supreme Court observed that "constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed... It is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against
stealthy encroachments thereon."
119. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
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